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Re-Assembling Osiris: Rule 23, the Black
Farmers Case, and Reparations
Kindaka Jamal Sanders*
Abstract
This Article examines why the Black Farmers case, a series of legal
events involving claims of racial discrimination by African-American
farmers against the federal government, may technically qualify as a
slavery reparations case. This Article also explores how the case became
a viable slavery reparations case in a legal and political environment
hostile to race-based claims and fatal to slavery reparations-related
litigation. In doing so, this Article offers a legally cognizable definition
for slavery reparations and a viable path for future reparations-related
litigation.
The procedural mechanisms at play in the Black Farmers case
substantially reduced the barriers between race-aggrieved status and
recovery. This Article posits that a close relationship between race-
aggrieved status and recovery and central to any definition of
reparations.
One procedural mechanism that helps to convert the Black Farmers
case into a slavery reparations case is the highly controversial class
action device. Commentators critical of the class action device argue
that the coercive force of class actions gives plaintiffs inordinate power
to force the settlement of meritless claims. This Article suggests that the
class action device was used in the Black Farmers case not to circumvent
merit, but to vindicate it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The slavery reparations debate-the debate concerning the alleged
debt owed to African Americans for the continuing harm caused by
slavery-has long since subsided, with reparations opponents seeming to
have carried the day.l However, it may well be that the dead have arisen,
newly incarnated, in the Black Farmers case cluster.2 The Black Farmers
case is a massive race discrimination case originally filed by a class of
black farmers in August of 1997 as Pigford v. Glickman.3 The plaintiffs
claimed that the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
discriminated against them systematically in the awarding of farm
ownership and operating loans.4  The Pig/ord case ended in an
unprecedented civil rights settlement of over a billion dollars.5  More
than 15,000 farmers recovered,6 and an additional 65,000 claimants 7 may
1. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the
Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 1,22-27 (2007).
2. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14012, 122
Stat. 1651, 2209-12; In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 78
(D.D.C. 2011); Pigford v. Glickman (Pigford I), 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999); see
infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases and controversies
that create the Black Farmers case cluster.
3. Pig/ord 11, 185 F.RD. 82 (D.D.C. 1999); Pigford v. Glickman (Pigford 1), 182
F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998).
4. Pig/ordl, 182 F.RD. at 342-43.
5. See TADLOCK COWAN & JODY FEDER, CONG RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE
PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS 4-6
(2013), available at http://bit.ly/lja82Ns.
6. Id.
7. See John Zippert, Judge to Make 'Prompt'Decision in Pigford II Black Farmers
Case Settlement, GREENE COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Sept. 8, 2011, http://bit.ly/HXEKXc.
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yet recover under a new iteration of the Black Farmers case, In re Black
Farmers Discrimination Litigation,8 which was recently settled.
In December 2010, President Obama signed into law a bill, the
Claims Resolution Act of 2010, providing $1.1 billion to fund the
settlement of In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation.9 The bill
was passed over the objections of some lawmakers in Congress,
including Representative Steve King from Iowa, who argued that the
Black Farmers case was just a slavery reparations case in disguise. 0 His
argument was that due to the low burden of proof that claimants had to
meet in order to recover, and the lack of procedural safeguards against
fraud, most of the African Americans who stood to recover had no
connection to farming." Representative King further asserted that this
sort of loophole was intended by the congresspersons, in particular then-
Senator Barack Obama, who enabled various pieces of legislation along
the case's trajectory, including a bill tolling the statute of limitations in
the case.12  Although this Article characterizes the issue much
differently, it agrees with Congressman King that the procedural
mechanisms at play in the Black Farmers case substantially reduced the
barriers between race and recovery. This Article also does not deny that
the Claims Resolution Act could be seen as reparations, and furthermore,
it is argued here that a close relationship between race and recovery is
central to any workable definition of reparations.
The Black Farmers case may constitute a technical reparations
effort or, put differently, a reparations-related action, because of the
nature of the relief sought, the historical circumstances justifying relief,
and the technical processes that enabled recovery. This Article focuses
on the technical processes that enabled recovery. It does so because
technical issues, such as standing, statute of limitations, and causation,
have been at the heart of the failure of slavery reparations litigation since
the beginning. 3 What is so remarkable about the Black Farmers case is
that it was able to surmount these procedural and technical obstacles. At
8. In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011).
9. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, § 201, 124 Stat. 3064,
3070-72.
10. See Editorial, Probe Pigford Fraud, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 22, 2011, at
Al 2, available at http://bit.ly/l cxeBrc.
11. See Rachel Slajda, Steve King: Black Farmers' Settlement Is "Slavery
Reparations" (Video), TALKING POINTS MEMO (Nov. 30, 2010, 5:43 PM),
http://bit.ly/gwmJoZ; see also Press Release, Office of Congressman Steve King, King:
"Stage Set for Investigation of Pigford 11 Fraud" (June 17, 2011), available at
http://1.usa.gov/17wHCAi.
12. See sources cited supra notes 10- 11.
13. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the
Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL. 183, 186 (2006).
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the core of the black farmers' feat are two primary mechanisms: class
certification and claims adjudication.
This Article examines why the Black Farmers case may technically
qualify as a slavery reparations case. It explores how the case became a
viable slavery reparations case in a legal and political environment
hostile to race-based claims and slavery reparations-related litigation. In
doing so, this Article offers a legally cognizable definition for slavery
reparations and a viable path for future reparations-related litigation. In
describing the path for future reparations litigation, this Article highlights
the role of the class action device as essential to the reparations equation
in the Black Farmers case.
Commentators critical of the class action device argue that the
coercive force of class actions gives plaintiffs inordinate power to force
the settlement of meritless claims. 14 It is argued here, however, that in
the Black Farmers case, the class action device was not used to
circumvent merit, but instead to vindicate it. This Article is divided into
the following parts: Part II provides an overview of the reparations
debate; Part III discusses some prominent reparations-based cases and
highlights lessons to be accounted for in future litigation; Part IV
discusses the Black Farmers case cluster; Part V examines the role of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the success of the
Black Farmers case; Part VI explores how the case can be used as a
model for future litigation-based reparations; and Part VII discusses
strategy for litigation-based reparations going forward.
II. THE REPARATIONS DEBATE
A. Reparations Defined
Reparations are defined here as relief afforded to members of a
racial, cultural, or ethnic group to repair the presumed harm caused by a
historic injustice.15 African-American reparations are, more particularly,
defined as a debt owed to African Americans to repair the presumed
harm caused by slavery and its vestiges. 16 Various models exist for the
acquisition of reparations. At issue in this Article is the litigation-based
model for reparations. Litigation-based reparations or, more generally,
14. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1391-92 (2000); see
also Andrei Greenawalt, Note, Limiting Coercive Speech in Class Actions, 114 YALE L.J.
1953, 1986-87 (2005).
15. See Antonio Raimundo, Comment, The Filipino Veterans Equity Movement: A
Case Study in Reparations Theory, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 575, 581-84 (2010).
16. Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Why Reparations to African Descendants in the United
States Are Essential to Democracy, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 633, 660-61 (2011).
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lawsuits premised upon the notion of group harm, shall be defined as
equitable relief afforded to a class of plaintiffs to repair the presumed
harm caused by a historic injustice.
Katrina Miriam Wyman, in her article Is There a Moral
Justification for Redressing Historical Injustices?, defines historic
injustices as:
[W]rongs that share four characteristics: (a) they were committed or
sanctioned at least a generation ago; (b) they were committed or
authorized by one or more collective agents, such as a government or
corporation; (c) they harmed many individuals; and (d) they involved
violations of fundamental human rights, often discrimination based
on race, religion, or ethnicity. 
17
The repair element of litigation-based reparations broadly equates to
"restoring the recipients to their rightful position."' 8 This would mean
economic damages for loss of intergenerational wealth, 19 as well as other
relief aimed at "rebuilding communities," repairing the psychological
harm2° caused by slavery, and removing the stigma that continues to
beset the descendants of slaves.21
Many advocates of slavery reparations have argued for financial
compensation to the individual descendants of slaves. 22 Others have
argued that any financial compensation should be placed in a trust for the
social, educational, and economic benefit of slave descendants and paid
from the general revenue of the United States. Implicit in the trust
concept of compensation is the recognition that while the primary harm
of slavery was to the slaves themselves, the harm to their descendants is
systemic and psycho-cultural. 24 Scholars who espouse the group-harm
theory of reparations seek relief that will repair the economic and
psycho-spiritual harm suffered by slave descendants as a socioeconomic
class.
2 5
17. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing
Historical Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 127, 134 (2008).
18. Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for
Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 542 (2003).
19. See Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1353-
54(2004).
20. See Brophy, supra note 18.
21. See Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 381-82 (1987).
22. See In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 731-33 (N.D.
111. 2005) aff'd in part as modified, rev'd in part, 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006).
23. RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 244-45
(2001).
24. See JoY DEGRuY LEARY, POST TRAUMATIC SLAVE SYNDROME: AMERICA'S
LEGACY OF ENDURING INJURY AND HEALING 119-25 (2005).
25. See Brophy, supra note 18, at 509.
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This Article advocates the group-harm theory of reparations. Thus,
it argues for relief crafted to cure the harm caused by slavery and its
vestiges. To this end, reparations must be distinguished from
compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are usually awarded to
compensate a victim for his or her injury.26  Thus, one may be
compensated for pain and suffering, but it would be impossible to repair
past pain and suffering. It is argued here that, technically, reparations
should not be offered to compensate the descendants of slaves, but to
redress the lasting social and economic harm presumably caused by the
institution of slavery. Ideally, reparations litigation and other actions
involving group harm should pursue equitable and non-individuated
monetary relief. As shall be discussed, having a technical definition of
litigation-based reparations that concentrates on injunctive and
declaratory relief may alleviate some of the procedural challenges facing
group-harm litigation.
Central to a litigation-based reparations model is the notion of
presumed harm, the idea that harm flows directly and almost inexorably
from membership in a race-aggrieved group, meaning that individual
harm is presumed from group harm. Under this conception of
reparations, proof of an express link between a plaintiffs injury and the
defendant's acts or omissions would be unnecessary. Thus, it is
presumed that the defendant's actions contributed to the state of being of
the plaintiff and that the defendant's actions are proof of the plaintiffs
exposure to racially mal-active circumstances, the creation of which can
be traced back to the defendant. Such a presumption of harm approach is
illustrated in the Black Farmers case's processes for claims resolution.
B. Philosophical Arguments for and Against Reparations
Proponents of slavery reparations argue generally that the U.S.
government and, in some instances, state governments and private
corporations owe relief to the descendants of African-American slaves
due to both the harm caused to slaves and to their descendants, and the
economic benefit slavery bestowed upon America as a growing nation. 27
Advocates also point to what they assert is the continuing harm caused
by the vestiges of slavery as evidenced by the statistical disparities that
continue between blacks and whites in education, employment, rates of
26. Careyv. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978).
27. See Wendy B. Scott, "CSI" After Grutter v. Bollinger: Searching for Evidence to
Construct the Accumulation of Wealth and Economic Diversity as Compelling State
Interests, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 927, 929-30, 933-34 (2004).
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incarceration, and wealth.28 Advocates also mention the relief for
historic injustices provided by our government to other races or
culturally aggrieved groups, including restitution made to the victims of
Japanese internment during World War 1129 and allowances made by the
federal government to Native Americans, 30 as well as to survivors of the
Holocaust.3'
The opponents of slavery reparations generally argue that the
victims of slavery are dead, as are the culpable parties, and that finding
the government or private corporations liable will only punish the
32innocent. Some commentators suggest that reparations have been paid,
in effect, through affirmative action programs and various other social
safety nets, including welfare.33 Some, such as the aforementioned
Congressman King, suggest that the sin of slavery was fairly and
adequately compensated by the death of white American soldiers who
fought in the Civil War.34 Still others believe that blacks are better off
because of slavery. 35
The slavery reparations debate has taken place in three arenas:
Congress and state legislatures, American courts, and international law. 36
Arguments for slavery reparations have failed in all arenas.
37
Representative John Conyers of Michigan has offered a bill to consider
the issue of slavery reparations in every congressional session since
1989.38 The bill has never made it out of committee.39 Most Americans
28. See Michael F. Blevins, Restorative Justice, Slavery, and the American Soul: A
Policy-Oriented Intercultural Human Rights Approach to the Question of Reparations, 31
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 267-68 (2006).
29. Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 449-453 (1998).
30. Pamela D. Bridgewater, Ain't I a Slave: Slavery, Reproductive Abuse, and
Reparations, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 98 (2005).
31. Edieth Y. Wu, Reparations to African-Americans: The Only Remedy for the U.S.
Government's Failure to Enforce the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, 3 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 403, 404 (2004).
32. See Brophy, supra note 18, at 502-03.
33. DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR
SLAVERY 14 (2002).
34. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations
Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 314-15 (2003); see also Anderson
Cooper 360 Degrees: Should Congress Police Itself?.; Slavery Reparations?; Child
Slavery in America (CNN television broadcast Dec. 1, 2010).
35. Ryan Fortson, Correcting the Harms of Slavery: Collective Liability, the Limited
Prospects of Success for a Class Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the
Reconceptualization of White Racial Identity, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 71, 94 (2004).
36. See Van B. Luong, Political Interest Convergence: African American
Reparations and the Image of American Democracy, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 253, 255-61
(2002).
37. Id. at 255.
38. See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989); Bridgewater, supra note 30, at 106.
39. See Bridgewater, supra note 30, at 107.
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are solidly against slavery reparations, 40 and there has never been a
reparations movement powerful enough to sway American opinion to
force the hand of Congress.'"
The most recent stage for the reparations debate has been slavery
reparations as a question of international law. Proponents of this
approach argue that the issue of slavery reparations is also an issue of
human rights.42 The United States, however, would most likely not
recognize any judgment of an international tribunal against it or any of
its corporate citizens. 43  Considering obstacles facing broad-based
slavery reparations in Congress and in courts, a coordination of litigation,
based in part on the Black Farmers case model, presents one of the few
avenues available for wholesale restorative justice in this area.
Ill. TECHNICAL HURDLES TO REPARATIONS LITIGATION
Reparations litigation has been all but abandoned. All broad-based
reparations litigation and most reparations-related litigation prior to the
Black Farmers case have terminated unsuccessfully. 44 The problems
with litigation-based reparations have been technical in nature.45 Such
problems typically involve issues of standing, proof, causation, and the
statute of limitations.46 The issue of sovereign immunity also provides a
barrier to recovery against national and state actors.47 One leading
reparations scholar, Alfred Brophy, argues that the technical problems
with litigation-based reparations stem from the fact that the perpetrators
of slavery are dead and from the difficulty of connecting any social
injury sustained by an individual descendant to the actions of culpable
parties generations removed.48  Some scholars also argue that any
derivative benefit to living defendants is difficult to trace and to quantify,
as is the harm caused to individual African Americans by any continuing
legacy of slavery.49
The foremost challenge to reparations-based actions to date has
involved the issue of standing.5° Standing is a constitutionally based
doctrine arising under the "case and controversy" requirement of Article
40. See Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations for Slavery, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1182-84 (2004).
41. See Blevins, supra note 28, at 261-65.
42. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 1, at 51.
43. Id. at 54 nn.258-59.
44. Id. at 24-30.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995).
48. See Brophy, supra note 18, at 503.
49. See Blevins, supra note 28, at 285-86.
50. See Fortson, supra note 35, at 104-05.
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III of the U.S. Constitution.5 It requires a plaintiff to establish a
concrete injury to himself and a connection between the origin of the
injury and the actions of the defendant.52 A plaintiff is also required to
show that any injury or threatened injury is redressable by court action.53
Standing is a jurisdictional issue.54 It thus threatens to thwart
litigation prior to discovery and before the class action can be certified-
in other words, before settlement is an attractive option for the defendant.
Consequently, while the class action device can possibly alleviate the
standing problem with respect to most members of the class, the active
plaintiffs would still have to establish standing.55 Due to the way courts
have interpreted the standing doctrine as it relates to race-based claims, it
is questionable whether any African American can establish standing to
sue on a broad-based reparations theory. 56
The standing problem produces several challenges to reparations-
related litigation. The first problem relates to individual claims of
current injuries stemming from slavery. 57 The standing doctrine requires
that the injury alleged by the plaintiff be his own and not that of
another. 58 Thus, African Americans are prevented from maintaining a
suit based exclusively on the enslavement of their ancestors.59 The harm
to the plaintiff has to be personal.60 The standing doctrine has also been
interpreted to limit claims of group injury61 or injuries deriving from
stigmatization. 62
One of the most important cases dealing with group injury is Allen
v. Wright.63 In Allen, a group of African-American parents brought a
nationwide class action lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS").64 The plaintiffs alleged that the IRS failed to adopt sufficient
standards and procedures that would prevent the IRS from awarding tax-
51. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
52. Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations Lawsuits,
20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 92-93 (2004).
53. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984).
54. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
55. See Miller, supra note 52, at 92-94; see also supra notes 153-56 and
accompanying text (discussing active and absent plaintiffs in the context of class actions
as representative litigation).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 92-95.
58. In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 752-54 (N.D. I11.
2005), affd inpart as modified, rev 'dinpart, 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006).
59. See Miller, supra note 52, at 92-94.
60. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
61. See Miller, supra note 52, at 94.
62. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755.
63. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
64. Id. at 739.
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exempt status to private schools that excluded black applicants. 65 The
Supreme Court held that the parents did not have standing to sue,
reasoning in part that the parents could not claim an injury based solely
on the social stigmatization that African Americans suffered from
discrimination perpetuated by segregated private schools.66 The Court
did find, however, a degree of merit in the parents' assertion that the
IRS's actions decreased their children's chances of being educated in an
integrated environment.67 The Court held that this constituted a legally
cognizable injury, but that the plaintiffs still lacked standing because the
injury was not "fairly traceable" to the conduct of the IRS.68 The Court
concluded that the causal connection between the IRS's grant of tax-
exempt status to segregated schools and the injury to the plaintiffs'
children was too indirect to meet the Article III standing requirement.69
The Court explained:
The diminished ability of respondents' children to receive a
desegregated education would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS
grants of tax exemptions only if there were enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in
respondents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to
make an appreciable difference in public school integration.
The leading case on slavery reparations, Cato v. United States,7 1 is
illustrative of the potential problems facing all reparations-related
litigation. In Cato, a group of pro se African-American plaintiffs
brought claims against the U.S. government for damages and equitable
relief arising out of the enslavement, kidnapping, transshipment, and
miseducation of African-American people.72 The suit also made claims
of continued discrimination.73 The plaintiffs' theory of the case turned
on an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment requiring the federal
government to proactively rid the country of the "badges and indicia of
slavery., 74 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's dismissal of the complaint, citing issues related to
standing and sovereign immunity.75 With regard to standing, the Ninth
65. Id.
66. Id. at 753-55.
67. Id. at 756.
68. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-57.
69. Id. at 757-58.
70. Id. at 758.
71. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 1106.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1108-09.
75. Id. at 1111.
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Circuit held that the named plaintiff, Cato, had to show a personal injury
derived from specific government inaction and that Cato did not have
standing to litigate claims on behalf of all African Americans injured by
racial discrimination.76 The court reasoned that "[w]ithout a concrete,
personal injury that is not abstract and that is fairly traceable to the
government conduct that she challenges as unconstitutional, Cato lacks
standing., 77 The court's reasoning turned on two aspects of standing:
(1) Cato's failure to identify a particular government agency or official to
whom to attach responsibility; and (2) Cato's failure to allege and
explain how she was personally affected by such a party's actions or
inactions.78
Cato is also useful in exploring another major hurdle to reparations:
the statute of limitations. The United States argued in Cato that the
plaintiffs' claims founded on wounds inflicted during and as a result of
slavery were barred by the statute of limitations. 79  Interestingly,
however, the court seemed to imply that, had Cato met the standing
requirement, her slavery-based claims would have survived a statute of
limitations challenge. 80 In doing so, the court gave some credence to
Cato's argument that the repercussions of slavery were ongoing and thus
covered by the continuing violations doctrine, which tolls the statute of
limitations for an initial violation when subsequent violations extend into
a period within the statute of limitations."
The Ninth Circuit held that Cato's monetary claims against the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act 82 were barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.83 Sovereign immunity is a federal
doctrine that shields the U.S. government and its agencies from civil
liability.84 Thus, in order for a party to maintain suit against the federal
government, the party must show that the government has explicitly
waived its immunity either in a specific instance or regarding a particular
law.85 The Cato court held that although Cato's monetary claims were
barred by sovereign immunity, the doctrine did not preclude Cato's
equitable claims. 86 This portion of the court's holding is based on the
76. Cato, 70 F.13d at 1109-10.
77. Id. at 1109.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1107-08.
80. Id.
81. Cato, 70F.3dat 1108-09.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
83. Cato, 70F.3dat 111.
84. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58
OKLA. L. REV. 439,440 (2005).
85. See Cato, 70F.3dat 1110.
86. Id. at 111.
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federal government's waiver of immunity in the Administrative
Procedure Act 87 from all suits seeking non-monetary relief.88 As to the
efficacy of Cato's equitable claims, the court ruled that Cato lacked
standing to assert even non-monetary claims for discrimination based on
group stigmatization.
89
Although the plaintiff in Cato was unsuccessful, the case does
present a few lessons for litigation-based reparations going forward.
First, the Ninth Circuit's hostility toward abstract injuries should be
viewed in light of the Supreme Court's findings in Allen regarding
stigmatizing injuries.90  Specifically, injuries deriving from group
stigmatization are cognizable under the standing doctrine so long as the
stigmatizing injury can be directly linked to the defendant and is personal
to the plaintiff.9' Second, the continuing violations doctrine may,
conceivably, be used to overcome issues with the statute of limitations
when slavery itself is used as the origin of injury. 92 Last, litigation
pursuing non-monetary damages stands a better chance of overcoming
procedural obstacles because such litigation is less likely to provoke
questions of government immunity and, as shall be discussed, is more
likely to procure the benefits associated with class action treatment.
93
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's analysis in In
re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation94 illustrates the
difficulties facing litigation-based reparations and provides further
direction for such litigation going forward. 95 In re African-American
Slave Descendants was a slavery reparations class action brought by a
class of African Americans against several domestic and foreign
corporations with links to the slave trade. 96 The plaintiffs alleged that
these corporations, primarily banks and insurance companies, benefited
from the slave trade by, for example, insuring slave ships or slaves.
97
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the
litigation on several grounds.98 Central to the district court's holding,
however, was the issue of standing. 99 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
87. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
88. Id. § 702.
89. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1111.
90. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984).
91. Id.
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108-09.
93. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702; Cato, 70 F.3d at 1110-11; Sisk, supra note 84, at 440.
94. In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006).
95. See generally id
96. See In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill.
2005), affdin part as modified, rev'd in part, 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006).
97. Id. at 738-40.
98. Id. at 780-81.
99. Id. at 743-52.
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remarked that "[i]t would be impossible by the methods of litigation to
connect the defendants' alleged misconduct with the financial and
emotional harm that the plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result of
that conduct."' 00
First, the court held that lineage in and of itself was insufficient to
confer standing, stating "the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong to the
descendants.' 0'1 The court also deflected the plaintiffs' argument that
the defendants' actions increased or prolonged slavery and thus robbed
their ancestors of the opportunity to create wealth as freemen and, by
extension, decreased the plaintiffs' chances of receiving this wealth as an
inheritance. 102 The court found that the "causal chain is too long and has
too many weak links for a court to be able to find that the defendants'
conduct harmed the plaintiffs at all, let alone in an amount that could be
estimated without the wildest speculation."'0' 3
In re African-American Slave Descendants seems to have signaled
the death knell for slavery reparations through litigation. However, the
holding in the case is not as comprehensive as it first appears. The
Seventh Circuit's findings are in conflict with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Allen to the extent that the Seventh Circuit implies that the
plaintiffs' claim of decreased chance of inheriting wealth °4 is not a
cognizable injury under the Standing Clause of Article III. In Allen, the
Supreme Court found that a decreased likelihood of being educated in an
integrated school is an injury cognizable under the doctrine of
standing.'0 5  Arguably, another court or circuit could take a more
expansive view of the injury, the defendant, and/or the injury connection.
Thus, the standing doctrine should not discourage the filing of
reparations-related litigation. Such claims can be filed in different
circuits or based on different legal theories in the same circuits. To this
end, it is useful to explore a piece of reparations-related litigation that
worked-the Black Farmers case.
IV. THE BLACK FARMERS CASE CLUSTER
The Black Farmers case is composed of three legal events:
(1) Pigford v. Glickman;0 6 (2) the enactment of Section 14012 of the
100. In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 759-60.
103. Id. at 759.
104. Id. at 759-60.
105. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984).
106. Pigfordll, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).
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2008 Farm Bill; 10 7 and (3) In re Black Farmers Discrimination
Litigation.'18  The Pigford case was brought by a class of African-
American farmers against the USDA for claims rooted in historic
discrimination against black farmers in the provision of farm loans and
benefit services.10 9  The Pigford plaintiffs alleged: (a) systematic
discrimination in the award of farm ownership, operating loans, other
credit services, and program benefits; and (b) a systematic failure to
process and investigate complaints of discrimination. °"0 The Pigford
case ended in a historic settlement agreement that created a claims
process by which aggrieved class members could have their claims
heard."' Successful claimants received monetary relief as well as class-
wide injunctive relief, including debt discharge and restoration of
foreclosed property. 112 However, the majority of would-be claimants
were left out of the Pigford settlement because they attempted to file
after the claim deadline had passed. 113 There were so many farmers left
out that Congress conducted hearings on the adequacy of the notice
provided to potential class members regarding the settlement. 
114
Congress determined that notice was inadequate and enacted the second
legal event in the Black Farmers case: Section 14012 in the Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008.115
Section 14012(a)(4) gave a cause of action to all black farmers who
met the Pigford class definition" 16 and attempted to file a claim in the
Pigford settlement; however, those who did not file a claim on time did
not receive a determination on the merits. 1 7 Section 14012 codified the
107. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14012, 122
Stat. 1651, 2209-12.
108. In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d. 78 (D.D.C. 2011).
109. Pigfordll, 185 F.R.D. at 86.
110. See id at 92-95.
111. Id. at97.
112. Id.
113. See CowAN &FEDER, supra note 5, at 4.
114. "Notice" Provision in the Pigford v. Glickman Consent Decree: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1
(2004).
115. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14012,
122 Stat. 1651, 2209-12; see also PigfordII, 185 F.R.D. at 88-89.
116. See § 14012, 122 Stat. at 2210. The Pigford court defined the class as:
All African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between
January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in
a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were
discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that
application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997,
regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application.
Pig/ordII, 185 F.R.D. at 92.
117. § 14012, 122 Stat. at 2210.
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claims process outlined in the Pigford consent decree.118 The third legal
event, of course, was the litigation that arose out of Section 14012,
brought by the late-filers to the Pigford settlement; the litigation
consisted of 17 putative class actions, which were consolidated under the
heading In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation.1 9 In re Black
Farmers ended in a settlement boasting even more favorable terms than
did Pigford, further reducing the claimants' barriers to recovery. 
1 20
A. The Historical Circumstances Justifying Relief
The Black Farmers case qualifies as a reparations case in part
because of the historical circumstances justifying relief. The idea of
reparations connotes past injuries not redressed at the time of their
creation but left to fester over time. These historical circumstances are
also integral to understanding why the Pigford case was certified as a
class action, and thus able to circumvent the hurdles preventing
successful reparations-related litigation.
The original black farmers were farmers-by-force-in other words,
slaves. General T. Sherman of the Union Army issued a field order at
the close of the Civil War, which promised 40 acres and a mule to the
newly freed victims of slavery. 121 The government promised to sell or
lease land to the freed slaves and to loan a government mule to ready the
land. 22 The federal government also created the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands ("Freedman's Bureau") to assist with
the former slaves' transition from slavery to freedom. 123 The Freedman's
Bureau provided a range of social and economic support. Approximately
40,000 African Americans were able to purchase or lease property
pursuant to this plan. 124 However, the Freedmen's Bureau was soon
stripped of its powers and much of the property that African Americans
were able to acquire was confiscated and transferred to loyalists of the
Confederacy. 25 Despite these odds, African Americans were able to
procure a substantial amount of property by the 1920s. 126  This
acquisitive resilience would be further challenged, however, by the
actions of an institution many African-American farmers regarded as
118. Id. at 2209-12.
119. In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d. 78, 78-80 (D.D.C.
2011).
120. Id. at 82-84.
121. See Blevins, supra note 28, at 261.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See Blevins, supra note 28, at 261.
125. Kristol Bradley Ginapp, Note, Jim "USDA " Crow: Symptomatic Discrimination
in Agriculture, 8 DRAKE J. AGPdc. L. 237, 239 (2003).
126. See id at 241.
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"the last plantation" 27: the USDA. Between 1900 and 1999, there was a
98 percent decrease in the amount of black farmers in this country. 128 In
1920, there were 925,000 African-American farms, while there were less
than 18,000 in 1999.129 Much of this attrition is attributable to the
USDA. 3°
Although the belief that the USDA was involved in a "conspiracy to
force minority and socially disadvantaged farmers off their land through
discriminatory loan practices" is widespread,13' the decrease can be
traced more objectively to a post-New Deal restructuring of the USDA.
This diminution was then accelerated in the 1980s by the dismantling of
the USDA's Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication
("OCREA").
132
As a result of the New Deal, the power to decide USDA loan and
benefit applications was transferred to local county committees.
33
Farmers in each county would elect a group of farmers from their ranks
to serve on a three- to five-person committee that determined farm loan
and benefit applications. 134 The committee would then appoint a county
executive who would be charged with the responsibility of helping
farmers to complete farm and benefit applications 13 The county
committee members, despite awarding federal money and being paid
from federal funds, were not considered federal employees.' 36 More
importantly, as the court observed in Pigford, "[t]he county committees
do not represent the racial diversity of the communities they serve."'
137
Unfortunately, this disparity in representation affected the type and
quality of loans, if any, provided to African Americans. For decades,
African-American farmers complained that the county committees
discriminated against them. 138 This discrimination took several forms,
127. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: A REPORT BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM 2
(1997) [hereinafter CRAT REPORT], available at http://bit.ly/lhM3stz.
128. Mark A. Bunbury, Jr., "Forty Acres and a Mule"... Not Quite Yet: Section
14012 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 Fails Black Farmers, 87 N.C.
L. REv. 1230, 1234 (2009).
129. PigfordlI, 185 F.RD. 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1999).
130. Id.
131. See CRAT REPORT, supra note 127, at 2.
132. Monica M. Clark, So Near, Yet So Far: The Past, Present, and Future of the
Complaints Process Within the USDA, 32 S.U. L. REv. 139, 147 (2005).
133. Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining
Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales
of Tenancies in Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 505,528 (2001).
134. PigfordII, 185 F.RID. at 86.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 86-87.




including denying loans, refusing to give African-American farmers loan
applications, providing loans late, attaching restrictive conditions, or
granting loans in insufficient amounts. 39
Prior to 1983, farmers who were the victims of discrimination could
appeal to a state body and then, if necessary, a national body, to have the
challenged loan decision potentially reversed. 140  However, in 1983,
OCREA was dismantled. 141  While the USDA had an extensive
bureaucracy set up to deal with complaints of discrimination, complaints
ultimately had to go through OCREA. 142 The formal complaint structure
within the USDA was gutted with the dismantling of OCREA.143 Most
complaints of discrimination filed by farmers were ignored and, in some
cases, even thrown into the trash.144 Thus, African-American farmers
had no effective recourse within the USDA. As a result, the loss of
black-owned farmland through foreclosures and failed operations due to
financial difficulties increased markedly. 1
45
In 1994, the USDA commissioned a study to examine the treatment
of African Americans in the USDA's loan and credit services. 146 The
study revealed large disparities between minorities and their white
counterparts in participation in USDA programs. 147  In 1996, the
Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, appointed a Civil Rights Action
Team to investigate racial bias in the USDA's farm loan programs. 148
The Action Team concluded that "[m]inority farmers have lost
significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of
discrimination by [Farm Services Agency] programs....
B. The Technical Processes that Enabled Recovery
Reparations are, at the core, about historic injustices. Because
reparations involve injuries occurring over a span of time, the practical
application of the concept causes several litigation-related problems. As
suggested earlier, the American legal system's technical rules, such as
statutes of limitation and standing, are designed to foreclose litigation
139. PigfordIl, 185 F.R.D. at 87.
140. Id. at 88.
141. Id.
142. CRAT REPORT, supra note 127, at 22-25.
143. PigfordHl, 185 F.R.D. at 88.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 87.
146. See COWAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 1.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2.
149. CRAT REPORT, supra note 127, at 30.
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under some of the very circumstances that define slavery reparations-
time-accumulated injury to a group.
150
The Black Farmers case managed to circumvent many of the
barriers traditionally associated with historic injuries. In order to explore
how the Black Farmers case did this, it is necessary to explore further the
notion of presumed harm embedded in the idea of litigation-based
reparations. Litigation-based reparations have been defined here as
equitable relief sought to correct the presumed harmed caused by a
historic injustice.15' In essence, harm to the individual is presumed, to
some degree, from harm to the group. Then, in a given legal process, the
more closely the relief is conditioned upon membership in an aggrieved
group-as opposed to other factors such as causation and discrete
injury-the more the case resembles reparations. Thus, the technical
processes in the Black Farmers case that closed the gap between race-
aggrieved status and recovery are essential to both the technical
definition of reparations and to their recovery.
The Black Farmers case contains several features indicating the
presumption of harm. For example, under the settlement agreement in In
re Black Farmers, a claimant did not have to produce a similarly situated
white farmer to establish her claim. 152  This essentially meant that
claimants in In re Black Farmers did not have to prove discrimination.
They did not have to provide any evidence of discrimination. There was
an irrefutable presumption that each claimant was discriminated against
based, arguably, on the notion that black farmers were typically
discriminated against. This presumption, however, was not endemic to
the causes of action on which the Pigford case was based, but was
instead forged by the sheer power of another instrumentality-the class
action device.
V. RULE 23 AND THE BLACK FARMERS CASE
A class action is litigation by representation. An individual plaintiff
or a small group of plaintiffs, called active plaintiffs, represent the legal
interests of a larger group of plaintiffs, called absent plaintiffs. 153 Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs federal class
actions. 54  The procedural purpose of the class action is judicial
150. See supra Part Ill; supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
152. See generally In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 78
(D.D.C. 2011).




economy.1 55 The theory is that, if the interests of the active and absent
plaintiffs are aligned closely enough, then simply resolving the interests
of the active plaintiffs can save time, effort, and expense, thus also
resolving the issues of the absent plaintiffs. The close alignment of the
interests of the active and absent plaintiffs also ensures due process and
fairness. 156
A case becomes a class action through the process of class
certification. This process involves a court examining a number of
factors to ensure that the general goals of a class action are met in a
particular action. 157 The certification process also requires the putative
class to establish that its action fits into one of three types of class
actions.1 58 When the court is assured that all of the requirements have
been met, the court issues an order officially designating the litigation as
a class action. 59  The factors the court examines are as follows:
commonality, numerosity, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 
1 60
The commonality factor requires that the claims of all the members of
the class be so closely related that they are amenable to common
solutions. 1 The numerosity factor ensures that there are enough class
members to justify the added procedural complications created by the
class action device. 162  The typicality factor ensures that the active
members will represent properly the interests of the absent plaintiffs by
requiring that the claims of the active plaintiffs are of the same variety as
the claims of absent plaintiffs. 163 The adequacy of representation factor
is meant to ensure that the parties representing the class members,
including the lead plaintiffs and class counsel, are capable, experienced,
and knowledgeable enough to effectively represent the class.' 
64
One of the most important and most litigated factors is
commonality. 165 It was the factor most contested during the certification
155. Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV Class Action
Reform: An Assessment of Recent Judicial Decisions and Legislative Initiatives, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1806-07 (2000).
156. ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A
NUTSHELL 38-39 (3d ed. 2007).
157. Id. at 565-66.
158. Mohsen Manesh, The New Class Action Rule: Procedural Reforms in an Ethical
Vacuum, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 923, 926-27 (2005).
159. See Pigfordl, 182 F.R.D. 341, 345 (D.D.C. 1998).
160. See KLONOFF, supra note 156, at 27.
161. Seeid. at38.
162. See id. at 34.
163. See id. at 46-47.
164. Seeid. at51-61.
165. Raul Zermeno, Supreme Court Raises the Bar for Class Actions, SOC'Y FOR
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://bit.ly/lavbHnl.
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of Pigford.16 6 Again, commonality refers to the claim or claims that
unite the class. 167 It is possible for some claims to be eligible for class
treatment while other closely related claims are ineligible. For example,
the two common issues raised in Pigford included allegations of a
systematic failure by the USDA to process and investigate complaints of
discrimination and the question of whether the statute of limitations on
older claims should be tolled for equitable reasons. 168 Allegations of
systematic discrimination, the chief cause of action in Pigford, failed to
satisfy the commonality requirement. The discrimination was varied in
circumstance and enacted by many disconnected county committees
making independent loan decisions, 169 while the USDA's failure to
investigate complaints of discrimination was a central and systemic
breakdown traceable to a general departmental failure. Because the court
determined that the systematic breakdown of the complaint process did
meet the commonality requirement, it became less important for the class
to receive class treatment for the more substantive allegations of race
discrimination. 170 This is true because of the bargaining power created
by the certification of the less substantive issues. Thus, under Rule
23(a)'s commonality requirement, the ability for a party to certify at least
one common issue, even if subordinate, and have the entire case proceed
can be instrumental in obtaining litigation-based reparations.
The litigation-based reparations strategy should focus not on
resolving all of the underlying issues at trial, but on finding one or more
common issues on which to hinge class certification. As shall be
discussed, the certification of the class is key. The goal of litigation-
based reparations is not necessarily to recover reparations through the
trial process, but to do so by any lawful means necessary.
As mentioned above, the putative class must establish that the
litigation fits into one or more class action types under Rule 23(b).17
There are three major class action types. 172 Broadly speaking, these are
166. Pigfordl, 182 F.R.D. 341, 344-49 (D.D.C. 1998).
167. See Manesh, supra note 158, at 926.
168. PigfordI, 182 F.R.D. at 348-49 (noting that the discrimination was too varied in
circumstance and manner to lend itself to class action treatment). The court observed that
individual instances of discrimination did not arise from a central policy of the USDA but
instead were carried about by individual, unconnected county supervisors making
independent decisions regarding credit applications. Id.
169. Pig/ordIl, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86-87 (D.D.C. 1999).
170. Pigford I, 182 F.R.D. at 349. The court in Pigford also determined that the
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was subject to class treatment, as the
underlying issue was whether the circumstances generally called for tolling, as opposed
to the individual circumstances of each farmer. See id. at 348.
171. See Manesh, supra note 158, at 926.
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). A fourth class action type arises under Rule
23(b)(1)(A) and focuses on protecting the defendant from the conflicting judgments that
[Vol. 118:2
RE-ASSEMBLING OSIRIS
the limited fund class action, the damages class action, and the civil
rights class action.' 73 A limited fund class action is authorized if the
object of the litigation is an asset of fixed and limited value. 174 The
reasoning behind the limited fund class action is to protect non-parties
who may have an interest in the diminishable asset.175 The damages
class action, arising under Rule 23(b)(3), presents the most challenges to
certification. This is true because damages class actions focus more on
monetary relief, and thus present the specter of the court having to
individually adjudicate issues related to damages. 176 This, of course,
would destroy the efficiency claim justifying the class action. Plaintiffs
seeking to rely on this class action type are required to show that the
issues common to the class predominate over individual issues and that
the class action is the most efficient and just vehicle for handling the
claims. 177 The Black Farmers case would have problems satisfying this
requirement due to the claims of systematic discrimination and
individualized damages.
Civil rights class actions are more readily certified than are damages
class actions, due in part to the fact that the civil rights class only has to
show one common issue of law or fact, whereas the damages class has to
establish that common issues dominate. The civil rights class action,
arising under Rule 23(b)(2), focuses on the actions of the defendants as
opposed to the injuries of the plaintiffs. 78 It thus authorizes certification
if the primary form of relief sought is class-wide injunctive or
declaratory relief and if any requested monetary relief is incidental to the
request for equitable remedies.179 Pigford was certified as a civil rights
class action due to the nature and importance of the injunctive and
declaratory relief sought. 180 It was, however, converted to a damages
class action as a result of the settlement agreement. 181 Thus, the class
was able to negotiate a class status that the court, of its own volition,
would have been hard-pressed to justify.
may be imposed if several disconnected actions are pursued. See Manesh, supra note
158, at 926 (discussing this fourth category of class actions).
173. See Manesh, supra note 158, at 926-27.
174. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S 815, 815-16 (1999).
175. Manesh, supra note 158, at 927.
176. See Neil K. Gehlawat, Note, Monetary Damages and the (b)(2) Class Action. A
Closer Look at Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1535, 1547-50 (2012).
177. Id. at 1537.
178. See PigfordI, 182 F.R.D. 341, 349-50, 351 (D.D.C. 1998).
179. See Gehlawat, supra note 176, at 1536-37.
180. PigfordI, 182 F.R.D. at 351.
181. Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D.D.C. 1999) ("By Order of January 5, 1999,
upon motion of the parties, the Court vacated the Order certifying the class and certified a
new class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
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The civil rights class action, with its focus on righting institutional
wrongs, is the ideal vehicle for litigation-based reparations, as "it was
designed to provide a remedy to an entire plaintiff class that could root
out a complex legal wrong at its source., 182 The civil rights class action
under Rule 23(b)(2) has been used as an extension of, and in some cases
(including the Black Farmers case) as a catalyst for, mass social
movements, and has thus provided a major vehicle for social change in
the African-American community for decades.'8 3 In fact, the advisory
comments for Rule 23(b)(2) suggest that that the Rule 23(b)(2) class
action was created to enable the certification of civil rights and other
group claims. 184  This is why some commentators consider the class
action to be a "subversive element" in an otherwise ordered civil action
system committed to "party control and focus on the discrete merits of
each claim.'
8 5
While the civil rights class action is well suited for reparations-
related litigation, it is not without its limitations for individual plaintiffs.
The civil rights class action does not require the court to allow absent
members to opt out of the class and pursue their own cases. 186 Thus, the
civil rights class action treats the group members as indivisible. In this
way it is akin to legislative action, circumventing the traditional litigation
model. The very concept of the civil rights class action equates such
class actions with the notion of litigation-based reparations.
A. Increase in the Size of Class and Bargaining Power
In order to put the effect of the certification of the Pigford class into
its proper context, it is necessary to examine the procedural history of the
case. The lawsuit was filed in August of 1997 as a putative class
action. 187 Three named plaintiffs represented a putative class of 641. 188
The lawsuit was stayed in December of 1997 so that the parties could
pursue mediation. 189  However, the Justice Department refused to
negotiate the possibility of class-wide relief, instead insisting on a
process that involved, exclusively, individual claims resolution.190
182. Gehlawat, supra note 176, at 1544.
183. See generally Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan Case: A Direct Product of the Civil
Rights Movement, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1223 (1992) (book review) (detailing the
landmark New York Times v. Sullivan case and its impact on civil rights).
184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
185. David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561 (1987).
186. See Gehlawat, supra note 176, at 1548.
187. See CowAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 2.
188. PigfordlI, 185 F.R.D. at 89.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 90.
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Litigation resumed in March of 1998 and trial was set for February
1999.191 In October of 1998, the district court issued its opinion
certifying the class. 192  In January of 1998, Congress, under intense
pressure from advocacy groups and a social movement that had sprung
from the case, passed legislation tolling the statute of limitations for
claims arising between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996.193 A
few short weeks thereafter, on April 14, 1999, the court entered a consent
decree incorporating the terms of the parties' settlement agreement.
194
The consent decree identified class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief
and created a claims process for the adjudication of individual damage
claims.195
Before certification, the number of estimated class members in
Pigford increased from 661 to 2,000.196 When all was said and done,
well over 22,000 timely claims were filed, and of those, upwards of
13,000 were approved.197  Moreover, while a few claimants' late
applications were accepted, the majority-an estimated 70,000-of
claimants who filed late were excluded from the Pigford settlement.198
These potential class members would be the subjects of the 2008 Farm
Bill, which authorized the re-opening of the litigation.1 99 Thus, due to
the certification of the class in Pigford, the class members were able to
increase their numbers exponentially and, by extension, their bargaining
power.
The size of the class increased in large part due to class notification.
The process of class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that
potential class members be notified.200 Notice is optional under Rule
23(b)(2). 20' Depending on the type of class and number of potential class
members, notice is accomplished through individual mailings,
publications in magazines and newspapers, and through television and
radio networks. 2  The notification process invariably increases the size
of the class, and thus the magnitude of the defendant's liability and/or
responsibility. That is, due to class certification and notification, more
people stand to recover than would recover if they filed individual
191. Id.
192. Pigfordl, 182 F.R.D. 341, 351-52 (D.D.C. 1998).
193. See CowAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 3.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3-4.
196. See id. at 2.
197. Id. at 5.
198. See CowAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 5.
199. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14012,
122 Stat. 1651, 2209-12.
200. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
201. Id. 23(c)(2)(A).
202. See Manesh, supra note 158, at 925.
2013]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
claims.20 3 A defendant's opponents are multiplied, and, as in the Black
Farmers case, they are often multiplied exponentially. The risk of losing
on a major issue and almost instantaneously becoming liable to
thousands of people is harrowing for defendants. 204  Due to the
tremendous bargaining power created by the certification of the class in
Pigford, the class members were able to negotiate a claims structure that
amounted to reparations.
B. The Claims Process Enabled the Reparative Relief
The claims process is at the heart of what makes the Black Farmers
205case procedurally a slavery reparations case. In examining the claims
process, the most important aspect of recovery is race.20 6 The harms of
discrimination and economic loss are presumed to a certain degree.
These presumptions can be gleaned from the low burden required to
establish the elements of class membership and the low level of attention
207given to ensure that claimants were actually members of the class.
In Pigford, an initial part of the claims process required claimants to
establish that they were members of the class.20 8 They were required to
establish that they: (1) were African American; (2) farmed or attempted
to farm between 1981 and 1996; (3) applied or attempted to apply for a
credit transaction or benefit service; (4) believed they were discriminated
against; and (5) made a complaint of discrimination. 20 9 Establishing
class membership entailed completing a signed affidavit under penalty of
perjury attesting to the facts comprising the class requirements. 210 In
Pigford, membership attestations also had to be corroborated by the
declaration of a non-family member.211
The second part of the claims process involved the election of
tracks. There were two tracks or routes to recovery in the Pigford
21consent decree. 12 The first track, Track A, involved liquidated damages
213of $50,000 and an attenuated claims process. The second track, Track
B, involved a process more akin to regular litigation, such as binding
arbitration, where claimants have to establish their claims by a
203. See Rosenberg, supra note 185, at 567.
204. See Manesh, supra note 158, at 925.
205. See generally In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d. 78
(D.D.C. 2011).
206. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
208. Pig/ordII, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D.D.C. 1999).
209. Id.
210. Id at 96.
211. Id.
212. Id.




preponderance of the evidence. Due to the fact that many of the
claimants (a great deal of whom were filing on behalf of deceased
relatives) possessed no documentary evidence,215 only 169 claimants
elected Track B.2 16 Thus, the Track A process was central to the success
of Pigford. It has allowed tens of thousands of farmers to recover 217 with
little or no documentary proof.
218
The burden of proof for Track A claimants was reduced drastically
as compared to Track B claimants. Instead of claimants having to prove
the elements by a preponderance of the evidence, they only have to
provide substantial evidence. The consent decree defined substantial
evidence as "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support [the] conclusion, even when a plausible alternative interpretation
of the evidence would support a contrary view. 
219
Under the Pigford consent decree, Track A claimants had to
establish five elements of proof: (1) that they owned, leased, or
attempted to own or lease farmland; (2) that they applied for a loan or
benefit; (3) that the loan or benefit was denied, delayed, or decreased by
the USDA; (4) that a similarly situated white farmer was treated more
favorably; and (5) that as a result, the claimant suffered economic loss.
220
Under the Pigford claims process, 69 percent of the class members
recovered.22' More than 22,000 class members recovered under Track A,
and the government paid out damages exceeding one billion dollars.222
Although the recovery rate in Pigford was above average, it was
hampered by some of the provisions in the consent decree. The most
notable of these provisions required claimants to identify a similarly
situated white farmer. 223  Additionally, the Justice Department was
empowered to pay the decisionmakers, the arbitrator, and the claims
facilitator directly, 224 which arguably had an effect on how the
decisionmakers viewed the claims and resolved close factual questions.
214. Id. at 97.
215. See COWAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 4.
216. OFFICE OF THE MONITOR, STATISTICS REGARDING PIGFORD V. VILSACK: TRACK A
IMPLEMENTATION AS OF FEBRUARY 16, 2012 (2012), available at
http://l.usa.gov/l e8DMCi.
217. Id.
218. See PigfordII, 185 F.R.D. at96.
219. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id.
221. See COwAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 6.
222. Id
223. See id. at 4.
224. Id. at 3 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006)).
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More importantly, the Justice Department had the right to provide
documentary evidence contesting the attestations of the claimants.225
Over 9,000 claims were rejected as result of the documentary
22evidence provided by the Justice Department. 26 However, the In re
Black Farmers class members were able to negotiate these provisions out
of the claims process due to the continuing snowball effect produced by
the certification of the Pigford case. 27 Theoretically, the claims process
outlined in the In re Black Farmers litigation should increase the rate of
recovery for the claimants in that case. The In re Black Farmers
settlement is a remarkable example of the snowball effect produced by
class certification.
The claims process in In re Black Farmers, as an evolution of the
process originating in Pigord, provides the best model for reparations in
the context of litigation. In In re Black Farmers, the cause of the
claimants' injuries, race discrimination, was presumed.228 The claimants
were not required to introduce proof tending to show that they were
discriminated against. 229 They were only required to assert that they
applied or attempted to apply for a loan or farm benefit, and that they did
not get the service requested. 230  Thus, the reason for the denial,
discrimination, is presumed from the denial itself. This is what
reparations should look like in the context of litigation.
Although the structure of the claims process in In re Black Farmers
and in Pigford has a lot to do with the bargaining power of the plaintiffs,
much of the bargaining power resulted from the widespread nature of the
harm and the USDA's failure to keep accurate records of the evidence of
the harm. Thus, the USDA's failure to preserve evidence reduced the
claimants' responsibility to provide it, and the USDA's culpability in
creating a system of discrimination reduced the claimants' burden to
prove individual instances of discrimination. So, to some degree, the
USDA was held accountable not just for the harm it allegedly caused the
individual plaintiffs, but for the systemic nature of the harm-for the
harm it caused the group. Similarly, in the context of reparations, courts
evaluating issues of standing and causation should take into account the
breadth of the harm and the culpability of the defendants in creating
procedural burdens.
225. Consent Decree at 8-10, Pigfordll1, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-
1978), available at http://bit.ly/HQU33o.
226. OFFICE OF THE MONITOR, supra note 216.
227. Stephen Carpenter, The USDA Discrimination Cases: Pigford, In re Black
Farmers, Keepseagle, Garcia, and Love, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 27-32 (2012).
228. See generally In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 78
(D.D.C. 2011).
229. See generally id
230. See PigfordlI, 185 F.R.D. 82, 96-97 (D.D.C. 1999).
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C. The Reparative (Reparations?) Relief Structure
In essence, reparations are damages or relief. Litigation-based
reparations are the relief acquired through litigation and structured to
repair a historical wrong. So at a very basic level, the relief sought by
the farmers in the Black Farmers case constitutes reparations. In addition
to monetary damages, the Pigford consent decree, as well as the
settlement agreement in In re Black Farmers, provide for extensive
class-wide relief.231  Successful claimants are entitled to loan
forgiveness, return of foreclosed property, priority treatment in
applications for future loans, priority treatment in the acquisition of
inventory property, and assistance with the completion of any credit or
farm services application. 32 This relief looks a lot like the relief offered
to newly freed slaves by the Freedman's Bureau, the property promise
made by the U.S. government giving the newly freed the right to lease or
to purchase the uninhabited or abandoned government land confiscated
from the Confederacy, and the promise of assistance with reviewing
contracts with white farmers.233
VI. THE BLACK FARMERS CASE AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE
REPARATIONS CASES
The Black Farmers case provides a new framework for slavery
reparations, making the concept better suited for the traditional litigation
model. Again, the conceptual framework is as follows: the more
recovery is premised upon race-aggrieved status, and the less it turns on
other aspects of proof, such as injury or causation, the more it fits the
litigation model of slavery reparations. The ultimate reparations case,
requiring the lowest amount of proof, would be the case where recovery
is premised on proof of race-aggrieved status alone.
The trick for litigants of reparations-related cases is to close the gap
between race-aggrieved status and recovery. As described above, this
can be accomplished most effectively through the use of a combined
class action and social movement strategy.2 34 The class action should be
used as a blunt instrument to tear down procedural barriers, and as a tool
to organize class members and other interested parties to take steps to
externally influence the outcome of the litigation. This strategy was used
in the Black Farmers case to procure recovery for thousands of black
231. See generally In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 78
(D.D.C. 2011); Consent Decree, Pigford 11, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-1978),
available at http://bit.ly/HQU33o.
232. Pigford11, 185 F.RD. at 97.
233. See generally Blevins, supra note 28, at 261; Ginapp, supra note 125, at 239.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 178-86.
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farmers and/or their descendants, who, without documentary proof or
good recollection, would not have stood a chance of recovering at trial.
Additionally, the social movement strategy, with the integration of
several organizations, including farmers' advocacy groups, was able to
influence Congress to toll the statute of limitations.235
In addition to providing direction for litigants, the Black Farmers
case is instructive in terms of how courts should process future
reparations-related litigation or group-harm cases. Courts should treat
the issue of standing in cases involving group harm in the same or
similar manner in which class membership was determined in Pigford.
In order to establish standing to sue, a plaintiff should only be required to
prove by substantial evidence that: (1) she is an African American;
(2) she has an ancestor who was enslaved; (3) she was denied some right,
privilege, benefit, or opportunity; and (4) the denial occurred because she
is a descendant of slaves. At a minimum, a plaintiff would have to
submit an affidavit and a declaration by a third party supporting her
standing allegations. The genetic component of standing could be
established through genealogical research or genetic mapping. 236
Establishing these factors would create a rebuttable presumption that the
plaintiff has standing to sue. The defendant would then have to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the factors has not
been met. Such a judicial interpretation of standing is not outside the
purview of federal courts, as this formulation meets the general concerns
of the standing requirement.
A relaxed notion of standing is not foreign to our system of civil
justice. In the mass tort area, courts often find ways to resolve difficult
issues related to standing, which one scholar refers to as "act
attenuation.' '237 As Kaimipono David Wenger observes, "slavery itself
can be viewed as one of the earliest mass torts., 238 Indeed, mass tort
litigation and reparations-related litigation face common challenges. In
both areas "there is a potential connection between claimants and payers,
but it is of undeterminable strength. It is hard to match the victim to the
wrongdoer and to match the parties to the harm.
239
Wenger suggests a few mass tort tools, like statistical analysis and
the substantial factor test, for establishing the "link between slavery and
235. See CoWAN & FEDER, supra note 5, at 3; Kelly Toledano, Making Good on
Broken Promises: How the Pigford Settlement Has Given African-American Farmers a
Second Chance, 5 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS'N L.J. 68, 85 (2011).
236. See Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of Slavery,
89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2542-47 (2001).
237. Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery
Reparations Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 279, 290-93, 306 (2006).




current harms. 24 °  In the mass tort context, due to the difficulty of
tracing the origin of the plaintiff's injuries, courts often deal in
probabilities.241 If, for instance, it is likely that a particular defendant's
product caused the injury, then the causal factor is met.242 Likewise,
when several factors contribute to the plaintiffs injuries, then the causal
link is established if the defendant's actions contributed substantially to
the injury.
243
Therefore, it is not beyond courts' powers to take a more expansive
view of the standing doctrine. Courts' failure to do so may be due to the
failure of past litigants to make the connection between mass torts and
slavery reparations or due to courts' own biases against the claims. In
any respect, the factors for assessing standing outlined above provide a
workable framework for a willing judge.24
VII. STRATEGY GOING FORWARD
For reasons seen in this Article, it is unlikely that a single piece of
litigation will ever resolve the issue of reparations for the African-
American descendants of slaves. A reimagining of the slavery
reparations effort is in order. Litigation modeled on the Black Farmers
case, while concentrating on equitable relief and targeting discrete
manifestations of the badges and incidents of slavery, should provide the
focus. The Egyptian myth of Osiris provides a conceptual strategy for
addressing the reparations question using litigation as the catalyst.
Osiris was an ancient Egyptian deity who, emblematic of the setting
sun, was dubbed "lord of the perfect black," or, in some interpretations,
"the perfect black., 245 To the extent that perfection implies completeness
and wholeness, the myth of Osiris and his reassembly after decapitation
provides an interesting analogy to the quest for procuring African-
American reparations.
In many accounts, the myth of Osiris is an astrological play on the
movement of the celestial bodies and the corresponding changes in
seasons. In the myth, Osiris is portrayed as a god who left the heavens to
become an earthly king. He was opposed by Set, his brother. Set and his
companions plotted the death of Osiris. They fashioned a coffin for him
and then, at a party, cajoled him to enter it by offering a present to
anyone whose body was an exact fit. Once Osiris took the bait, the
240. Id. at 316.
241. See id. at 308-11.
242. See Wenger, supra note 237, at 288-89.
243. See id.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 236-43.
245. Deborah King, Isis and Osiris: The Love Story of Ancient Egypt, DEBORAH KING
CENTER (Sept. 14, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://bit.ly/lbtgZxa.
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coffin was shut and the lid sealed. Set and his companions then hoisted
the coffin into the Nile River. The coffin soon washed ashore and a tree
sprung up around it, completely encasing it. A Phoenician king, filled
with admiration for the tree, cut it down and took it to his palace in
Byblos. Osiris's wife, Isis, traveled the world in search of her husband,
and eventually happened upon Byblos. She collected the body, returned
it to Egypt, and hid it. But one night, Set discovered the hidden chest
and cut the body into fourteen pieces. He then scattered the fragments
throughout the land of Egypt. Isis, upon discovering what had happened,
went around the country collecting the pieces. She found all, save one.
Some versions of the story tell of the gods helping to reassemble Osiris,
whereupon the breath of life returned to him. He was thereby resurrected
from the dead and brought back to life.246
It is here suggested that African-American reparations effort be re-
envisioned as a series of class actions aimed at microcosmic ills,
mirroring Osiris's fragments, which themselves may be symptomatic of
broader, more rudimentary causes, such as those that have proved
unredressable within the current legal construct. In this regard, the
reparations effort going forward should be cast as a piecemeal addressing
of the wrongs engendered during the course, and as a consequence, of the
African-American experience in America.
Why litigation at all? Post-Reconstruction, most group progress in
the African-American community has been preceded by successful
litigation.247 Lawsuits, particularly class action devices, have the ability
to organize interests, create publicity, and apply pressure, which have
been indispensable in the African-American struggle for social parity. 48
The theory espoused here is that any legislative efforts to make whole the
African-American descendants of slaves must be preceded by mass
interest and group action. In this regard, class action lawsuits not only
energize the potential beneficiaries of the lawsuit, but also have massive
potential to spawn powerful social movements. 249  Additionally,
successful lawsuits serve to legitimize African-American claims of
institutionally engendered disparities in the eyes of an increasingly
doubtful public, and thus have great potential to sway public opinion.25°
246. Id.
247. See generally, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 344 U.S. 1 (1952); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
248. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.





Why focus on equitable relief? The court certified Pigford as a civil
rights class action under Rule 23(b)(2) despite plaintiffs claiming
substantial monetary relief.25 Under the Supreme Court's 2011 decision
in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes,252 it is doubtful that the class in
Pigford would have survived a 23(b)(2) certification analysis and thus
the class would have had to endure the more rigorous analysis applied to
damages actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3).253 Dukes involved several
consolidated putative class actions brought by female employees of Wal-
Mart throughout the country alleging sex discrimination by Wal-Mart in
the hiring and promotion of female management.254 The plaintiffs sought
both equitable and monetary relief in the form of back pay and punitive
damages.255 The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2),
finding that the equitable relief predominated over the request for back
pay.256 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the ruling
of the district court, finding that the commonality requirement had been
met, and that injunctive and declaratory relief were appropriate. 7 The
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the plaintiffs could not proceed
collectively because they failed to meet the commonality requirement
and because they were seeking substantial monetary damages.258
Pursuing class-wide relief increases the possibility of certification
because the analysis under Rule 23(b)(2) is less rigorous. As such,
excluding requests for individuated monetary damages allows the
litigation to retain some of the benefits associated with class action
status, namely bargaining power and, potentially, class notification.
Furthermore, pursuing equitable relief to the exclusion of monetary
damages circumvents the issue of federal sovereign immunity because
the government has waived its immunity with regards to non-monetary
relief.
259
Also, absent federal courts adopting the model of standing advanced
here and exemplified in the mass tort context, reparations-related
litigation should focus on discreet manifestations of the vestiges of
slavery. A collaborative group consisting of lawyers, law professors,
economists, social psychologists, psychologists, geneticists, political
scientists, and other professionals should be assembled to study the
effects of slavery and the resulting discrimination, alienation, and
251. See Pigfordl, 182 F.R.D. 341, 351 (D.D.C. 1998).
252. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
253. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
254. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
255. Id. at 2548.
256. Id. at 2549.
257. Id. at 2549-50.
258. Id. at 2556-58.
259. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995).
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disenfranchisement from the perspective of each field. The goal would
be to provide holistic solutions based on an integrative analysis of the
problem and its origins. The problem should be broken down into
solvable units, and lawyers should commence litigation to address each
unit. The units should contain identifiable victims possessing
quantifiable injuries, such injuries being at least statistically linkable to
one or more collective agents. All litigation should be launched closely
together so that any relief procured may affect as many African
Americans as possible, in as many areas of life as is possible, and in as
close a time period as is possible, to intensify the effects of the combined
relief-synergy. The professionals could also create scholarship and
various studies to provide an orchestrated and interdependent body of
support for reparations-related litigation and for the problems of standing
or causation that may arise. 260
A. The Need for Litigation Aimed at the Psycho-Cultural Legacy of
Slavery
A particular need to contemplate litigation crafted to address the
psycho-cultural legacy of slavery exists. Carter G. Woodson, in the
astoundingly insightful The Mis-Education of the Negro, famously
mused:
When you control a man's thinking you do not have to worry about
his actions. You do not have to tell him not to stand here or go
yonder. He will find his "proper place" and will stay in it. You do
not need to send him to the back door. He will go without being told.
In fact, if there is no back door, he will cut one for his special
benefit.
261
Here, Woodson is referring to a mentality that he believed plagued a
significant portion of the African-American population in 1933 and that
was engrained in the fabric of African-American life.262 While the great
thinker's implication that there had been an organized and intentional
effort to perpetuate this result is questionable, there can be little doubt
that various psychological control tactics were employed on the slaves
themselves, and many such tactics were explicitly used throughout the
260. See generally, e.g., TOM BURRELL, BRAINWASHED: CHALLENGING THE MYTH OF
BLACK INFERIORITY (2010) (examining the black inferiority complex as a disability
created by slavery and its vestiges).
261. CARTER GODWIN WOODSON, THE MIs-EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO 6-7 (Seven
Treasures Publ'ns 2010) (1933).
262. Id. at 5.
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Jim Crow era on many African-American citizens of the South.263
Whatever the origin, there seems to be a statistical link between these
tactics and the social psychology of far too many in the African-
American community. In a test performed several years ago where
several African-American children were given a choice between a white
doll and a black doll, the children overwhelmingly chose the white
doll.
264
More recently, another study was conducted to measure the effect of
racial stigma on scholastic performance. 265 Two groups of black students
took the same test.266 One group was reminded of their race immediately
before the examination.267 This group did markedly worse on the
exam. 268  So there can be little doubt that a culture of inferiority
developed in many aspects of the African-American community and was,
at the very least, passed down from generation to generation.269
Many scholars and social scientists agree that such a culture was
intentionally and necessarily created to control a population brought here
for the very purpose of subservience. 27 Many conservative
commentators would also agree that there is a sub-culture of inferiority
in the African-American community, although they would dispute the
origin of the culture.271 Many of these scholars seem to believe that this
culture was self-created and internally perpetuated, and thus, that the
government and the American people are devoid of any social or moral
responsibility to correct the issue.272 These arguments smack of the more
primitive arguments of innate black inferiority.273 If a culture of
inferiority exists, and slavery did not create it, and society did not
perpetuate it, then there is only one option left!
One potential class action suit could-although this Article makes
no claim regarding the viability of such a suit-be premised on the
notion that publicly funded institutions have not only failed to help
African-American students but have indeed harmed them by facilitating
263. See Michele Goodwin, Race as Proxy: An Introduction, 53 DEPAuL L. REv. 931,
932-34(2004).
264. Gwen Bergner, Black Children, White Preference: Brown v. Board, the Doll
Tests, and the Politics of Self-Esteem, 61 AM. Q. 299,299 (2009).
265. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995).
266. Id. at 799.
267. Id. at 808-10.
268. Id.
269. See generally Goodwin, supra note 263.
270. See id. at 932-35.
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., Gregory Kane, Why the Reparations Movement Should Fail, 3
MARGINS: MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 189, 189-90 (2003).
273. See Goodwin, supra note 263, at 932-34.
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the notion of black inferiority, therefore violating the rights of African-
American students to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a corollary, one could argue that "black inferiority complex" or
"internalized oppression" qualifies as a disability under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). 274 If so, publicly funded
institutions would be required under the IDEA to enact programming,




The Black Farmers case presents many lessons for reparations-
related litigation going forward due to the bargaining power the farmers
amassed. The certification of the class in Pigford increased the size and
power of the class exponentially and gave the class the bargaining power
to create a claims process and relief structure that, in effect, amounts to
reparations. The claims process, by allowing claimants to prevail with
little to no documented proof, substantially reduces the evidentiary
barriers between race and recovery and thus circumvents many of the
traditional procedural obstacles precluding successful reparations
litigation. The relief structure is, by definition, reparations because its
purpose is to repair harm, such as loss of property, farm operations, or
income, caused by a historic injustice.
Rule 23(b)(2) requires less for the certification of a class when
declaratory and injunctive reliefs are the primary remedies sought. A
focus on declaratory and injunctive relief makes the certification of civil
rights actions more probable, and, because of the strategic benefits
endemic to the class action vehicle, makes relief for individual class
members more likely.
The litigation-based conception of reparations contemplates
remedies that will fix the problems caused by slavery. This idea of
reparations coincides with pronouncements of the Supreme Court
regarding remedies meant to address race-borne injuries. As the
Supreme Court held in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,276 "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy., 277 In Swann, the Court took a results-oriented approach to
desegregating the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system by requiring
that the school actually desegregate as opposed to ceasing policies
resulting in segregation-that is, drawing racially neutral attendance
274. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
275. Id.
276. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
277. Id. at 16.
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zones. 278 Much has changed since Swann. The further removed we are
from the Civil Rights Movement, the less successful civil rights litigation
has become. Yet social ills rooted in racial inequities abound. Creative
strategies combining activism with adjudication, such as the strategy
employed by the Black Farmers litigators, are necessary to combat these
current legal hurdles.
278. Id. at 27-30.
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